We consider the problem of choosing a subset of a finite set of indivisible objects (public projects, facilities, laws, etc.) studied by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) . Here we assume that agents' preferences are separable weak orderings. Given such a preference, objects are partitioned into three types, "goods", "bads", and "nulls". We focus on "voting rules", which rely only on this partition rather than the full information of preferences. We characterize voting rules satisfying strategy-proofness (no one can ever be better off by lying about his preference) and null-independence (the decision on each object should not be dependent on the preference of an agent for whom the object is a null). We also show that serially dictatorial rules are the only voting rules satisfying efficiency as well as the above two axioms. We show that the "separable domain" is the unique maximal domain over which each rule in the first characterization, satisfying a certain fairness property, is strategy-proof. 
Introduction
Collective decision is often required to be made on multiple issues. We consider a simple model, in which each issue is associated with two possible decisions. For example, in Congress, legislators need to consider several bills at the same time. They can either accept or reject each bill. Another example is the problem of qualifying members of a society for a certain activity. Each member is either qualified or disqualified.
Such a problem can be represented by the problem of choosing a subset of a set of indivisible objects (public projects, facilities, laws, etc.) studied by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991).
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Each subset is an alternative and agents have preferences over these alternatives. A social choice rule, or simply, a rule, associates with each preference profile a single desirable alternative. We are interested in rules satisfying strategy-proofness, the requirement that no one can ever be better off by lying about his preference.
When there is no restriction on admissible preferences, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975) applies. Every strategy-proof rule satisfying the "full-range condition", or voter sovereignty, is dictatorial, when there are at least three alternatives. However, it is often the case that the consumption of an object affects agents' welfare separately from the consumptions of other objects. When preferences have such a "separability" restriction, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem does not apply. A great variety of strategy-proof rules, called schemes of "voting by committees", are characterized by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) . They also show that within these rules, only dictatorial ones are efficient, when there are at least three objects. These results are established under the additional restriction of linearity (no indifference between any two alternatives) on preferences.
They do not apply directly in the domain of separable but possibly non-linear preferences, which we think is more natural. Even if non-linear preferences are admissible, all schemes of voting by committees are still strategy-proof. However, they may not be the only such rules. On the other hand, no scheme of voting by committees is efficient when non-linear preferences are admissible (dictatorial schemes are "weakly efficient" but not efficient). In order to satisfy efficiency, we need more sophisticated decisions. No earlier study on this choice problem, so far, provides a characterization of strategy-proof rules for separable and possibly non-linear preferences. We establish one such result by imposing the following two additional requirements.
Given a separable preference, objects are partitioned into three kinds; "goods", "bads", and "nulls" (an object is a good if its consumption always increases the welfare, independently of other objects; it is a bad if its consumption always decreases the welfare; it is a null if its consumption never makes any difference). 2 We require that decisions should rely only on such simple "three-tiered" information rather than the full information of preferences. We refer to this requirement as votes-only property and refer to rules satisfying it as voting rules. We next introduce a new requirement, called null-independence, which says that if an object is a null for an agent, then his preference should not play a critical role in the decision on this object.
We characterize the family of strategy-proof rules satisfying votes-only property and null-independence. This family (to be explained later) includes all schemes of voting by committees; it is much bigger than that. Adding efficiency, we characterize "serially dictatorial rules", under which a priority ordering of agents is given and the first agent, the dictator, always guarantees one of his preferred alternatives and the second agent always guarantees one of his preferred alternatives in the set of dictator's preferred alternatives and so on. Even though we weaken efficiency to weak efficiency (no simultaneous welfare improvement of all agents is possible), we cannot escape dictatorship. Finally, we show that the separable domain is the unique maximal "rich" domain over which each rule in the first characterization, satisfying a certain fairness property, is strategy-proof.
Votes-only property coincides with "tops-only property" when preferences are linear. As shown by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991), tops-only property is implied by strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty. However, when non-linear preferences are admissible, this implication does not hold: see Example ??. For linear preferences, any object is either a good or a bad (there is no null). So null-independence is vacuously satisfied by any rule.
Another important line of research on similar choice problems has been directed to study several normative requirements of social choice rules. Among others are Wilson (1975) , Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) , Kasher and Rubinstein (1998) , and Samet and Schmeidler (2001) . 3 We establish logical relations between our main requirements and the following two central requirements in 2 When preferences are additively separable, an object is a good if and only if it gives positive utility, it is a bad if and only if it gives negative utility, and it is a null if and only if it gives zero utility. 3 Kasher and Rubinstein (1998) and Samet and Schmeidler (2001) consider problems which are special examples of our choice problem. In particular, Samet and Schmeidler (2001) consider the "qualification problem", in which the set of objects coincide with the set of individuals.
this literature. Monotonicity requires that when the set of goods expands and the set of bads contracts for each agent, the choice should expand. 4 Independence requires that the decision on an object should rely only on agents' three-tiered evaluations on this object. 5 We show that voting rules satisfying monotonicity and independence are described in terms of sets consisting of pairs of disjoint groups, called "power structures". For each object, a power structure is given and the object is chosen if and only if the group of agents in favor of the object and the group against it constitute a pair in that power structure. Each power structure has the natural property that the decisive power of a group against another increases if the former group expands and the latter group contracts. We call the family of all such rules Family Φ * . We show that a voting rule satisfies strategy-proofness and nullindependence if and only if it satisfies monotonicity and independence. Therefore, rules in Family Φ . Our study is related with the following literature. Public goods problems often have the form of decisions from a discrete or indiscrete box (Cartesian product of intervals). Components of each point in the box represent levels of their corresponding public goods provision. In the 1-dimensional case, Moulin (1980) exhibits a remarkable contrast to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem by characterizing a great variety of strategy-proof rules for "single-peaked preferences". He focuses on rules, called "voting schemes", which depend only on agents' peaks for each preference profile. He shows that a family of rules, called "generalized median voter schemes" are the only strategy-proof voting schemes that respect unanimity in the following sense; whenever everyone's peak coincides, the common peak should be chosen.
Border and Jordan (1983) strengthen Moulin's conclusion by characterizing the same family of rules in the 1-dimensional case without focusing on voting schemes. They, moreover, extend this conclusion to the multi-dimensional case. They consider several multi-dimensional counterparts of the 1-dimensional single-peakedness. "Star-shaped" preferences have the "1-dimensional single-peakedness" over each linear path through the peak. "Separable" preferences have a uniform "marginal preference" over each coordinate, independently of values of other coordinates. Over the domain of star-shaped separable preferences or the domain of quadratic separable preferences, they characterize strategy-proof rules that respect unanimity.
When the alternative space is a discrete box, Barberà, Gül, and Stacchetti (1993) consider linear preferences satisfying, what they call, "multi-dimensional singlepeakedness" (given an alternative x, any alternative in-between x and the peak in terms of L 1 -norm is ordered in-between x and the peak). They show that "multidimensional generalized median voter schemes" are the only strategy-proof rules satisfying voter sovereignty. 6 Their conclusion is generalized by Le Breton and Sen (1999) . They identify a certain general richness condition for domains consisting of linear preferences. The condition encompasses a variety of domains including the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences. Under this richness condition, they characterize rules satisfying strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty. 7 When each coordinate in the alternative space contains only two points, the domain of separable linear preferences satisfies the richness condition. Thus, their conclusion generalizes also the result by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991), which is for such "coordinate-wise-binary choice problems".
Le Breton and Sen (1995) exhibit a difficulty of extending their "decomposability result" in linear preference domains to domains with possibly nonlinear preferences. In the coordinate-wise-binary case, we overcome such difficulty by imposing the two additional requirements, votes-only property and nullindependence, which do not have any logical relation with strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty altogether.
Le Breton and Weymark (1999) consider the multi-dimensional alternative space. While they also consider possibly non-linear preferences, their main conclusions rely either on the assumption that each coordinate has more than two points or on the assumption that each preference in the domain has a unique best alternative. Since neither of the two assumptions holds in our domain, their "component-wise dictatorship" conclusion does not apply. It is remarkable to notice that Le Breton and Weymark (1999) do not impose any additional requirement other than strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty. They prove that strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty imply tops-only property over certain restricted domains that include possibly non-linear preferences but not all of them. When all non-linear preferences are admissible, such an implication does not hold.
The existence of normatively appealing strategy-proof rules over restricted domains casts the following important question. How far these domains can be enlarged with the possibility result intact? This question is addressed by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) . They show that the separable linear domain is the unique maximal rich domain of linear preferences, over which normatively appealing schemes of voting by committees are strategy-proof. Whether a similar result holds without focusing on linear preferences is not studied by them. Since non-linear preferences may have multiple top alternatives, it is not clear how to define schemes of voting by committees. For separable preferences, such a difficulty can be resolved easily using the set of goods instead of top alternatives. In fact, the set of goods coincides with the intersection of all top alternatives for separable preferences. We make use of this intersection to define schemes of voting by committees for arbitrary domains and establish a similar maximal domain result without focusing on linear preferences. Our result also applies to other rules in Family Φ * which are not schemes of voting by committees. Maximal domain results are also established in extended models of multidimensional problems by Serizawa (1995) and Le Breton and Sen (1999) . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model (Section 2.1) and define some important families of rules (Section 2.2). In Section 3, we define our axioms. In Section 4, we state our characterization results (Section 4.1) and the maximal domain result (Section 4.2). We conclude with several remarks in Section 5. Finally, all proofs for Section 4.1 are collected in the Appendix. and each x ∈ A, we say that x is a null for R when x is a null for R i for each i ∈ N .
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For all R ∈ S N and all x ∈ A, N is partitioned into the group of agents for whom x is a good, denoted by N G x (R), the group of agents for whom x is a bad, denoted by N B x (R), and the group of agents for whom x is a null.
For each agent i, let D i ⊆ S be a set of his admissible preferences. Let We focus on rules that depend only on the simple information of preferences in terms of goods, bads, and nulls. Formally, a rule ϕ is a voting rule if it satisfies the following property:
. We refer to this property as votes-only property.
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8 For convenience, we denote each singleton {x} by x. 9 We use notation, R, R ,R,R , etc. for elements in R N . Following standard notational convention, we write i's component of R with R i and we write i's component of R with R i . 10 In the domain of separable linear preferences, votes-only property coincides with the "topsonly property" in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991).
Important Domain Properties
Our main results are established over the separable domain S N and they also hold over the additive domain S N add . We specify several properties of the two domains, which will play critical roles. Our results will apply to any other subdomains of the separable domain satisfying these properties. Therefore, in stating the domain properties, we do not restrict our attention only to the two domains.
However, we are only interested in domains that admit a sufficiently large variety of preferences in the sense described by the following three properties A1, A2, and A3.
The first property is that each object is potentially a good and also potentially a bad in the domain.
A1. For all i ∈ N and all
The second property is that for each agent i and each object x, if x is not a good for a preference R i , then there is another admissible preference R i that has more goods, including x, and less bads than R i .
A2. For all
The third property is that for each agent i and each object x, if x is a bad and a null for preferences R i and R i , respectively, then there is another admissible preference R i that has more goods and less bads than R i and for which x is a null.
A3. For all i ∈ N and all
Note that A3 is trivially satisfied by any domain in which no preference has any null; for example, the linear separable domain S N lin and any subdomain of S N lin . Two properties, A2 and A3, are somewhat complicated. However, they are implied by the following natural property. It states that for all two disjoint subsets of objects, each agent has an admissible preference in which the two sets become the set of goods and the set of bads.
A4. For all
Note that A4 is not satisfied by the linear separable domain S N lin . Yet, both A2 and A3 are satisfied by S N lin . Property A4 is similar to the "richness property" by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, p.605). Their richness property is stronger than the combination of A1, A2, and A3, for the case of linear separable preferences.
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The three properties are crucial for showing Proposition 1. We take several examples of domains satisfying them. (ii) A preference R 0 ∈ S is trichotomous if it is described by goods, bads, and nulls as follows: for all X, X ⊆ A,
Thus any agent with a trichotomous preference cares only about the "net" number of goods (the number of goods minus the number of bads). Clearly, each trichotomous preference is additive. Also all goods are indifferent, all bads are indifferent, and the utility of each good is equal to the disutility of each bad. Let We will make use of the following additional properties of the separable domain S N and the additive domain S N add . Roughly speaking, both of the first two properties state that there are at least three objects and the domain admits a sufficient variety of preferences in ordering the three objects.
Definition. A domain D satisfies Property P if there exist at least three objects and D satisfies the following two conditions:
∈ {x, y, z} , ∅ P i w; x P i ∅ P i y P i {x, z} P i z and for all w / ∈ {x, y, z} , ∅ P i w; xP i ∅, yP i ∅, zP i {x, y}, and for all w / ∈ {x, y, z} , ∅P i w; 11 It is easy to show that this property implies A2 and A3. For A2, let
12 The proof is available under request. 
Either one of Property P and Property Q is crucial for showing Propositions 2 and 3.
The next property says that for any preference and any good x (bad, respectively), there is an admissible preference that has the same sets of goods and bads as the initial preference and in which the utility (disutility, respectively) of x is so great that having x is always better (worse, respectively) than not having it, independently of decisions on other objects. 
Examples of voting rules
We define an important family of voting rules, crucial in our work. These rules make the decision on each object, according to a predetermined set of ordered pairs of disjoint groups, or a "power structure", as follows. The ob-ject is chosen if and only if the group of agents in favor of the object and the group of agents against the object constitute a pair in that set. In this case, the unanimous approval of the object by members in the first group "overpowers" the unanimous objection by members in the second group. Formally, let
For each x ∈ A, a power structure associated with x is a set C x of pairs of disjoint groups, satisfying P-monotonicity. A profile of power structures is a list (C x ) x∈A of power structures indexed by objects.
Definition. A rule is in Family Φ if there exists a profile of power struc-
Several properties of profiles of power structures are in order. A profile (C x ) x∈A satisfies power-unanimity, or P-unanimity if for all x ∈ A, (N, ∅) ∈ C x and (∅, N ) / ∈ C x . It satisfies power-neutrality, or P-neutrality if for all x, y ∈ A and all (
14 We call I x the index set for x.
Definition (Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991) . A rule ϕ is a scheme of voting by committees if for each x ∈ A, there exists a nonempty collection C x of groups of agents such that
Any scheme of voting by committees associated with (C x ) x∈A is the rule in Family Φ * associated with the following profile of simple power structures (
Note that by nonemptiness of C x , C x is nonempty. Then by part (i) in the above definition, 13 Power structures and Family Φ * are similar to "binary constitutions" and "binary decision rules" by Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979) , which are preference aggregation rules in the Arrovian social choice model. Binary constitutions have another restriction, called "asymmetry", since they are used to determine social ordering of two alternatives.
14 We denote the set of non-negative integers by Z + .
the profile satisfies P-unanimity. 
. Not every serially dictatorial rule is in Family Φ * . The power structure (C x ) x∈A of the serially dictatorial rule in Family Φ * , associated with π is such that for all x ∈ A and all disjoint non-empty groups
is a subset of a larger family of voting rules, in which decisions are made in the following procedure. First, for each object, the set of agents in favor of it and the set of agents against it are identified. Second, based on these two groups, the "score" for the object is determined by a "scoring function" that maps each pair of disjoint groups into the score (a real number) for the object. Third, given a list of scores for all objects, the "threshold score" is determined by a "threshold scoring function" that maps each list of scores into a threshold score. Finally, each object is accepted if and only if its score is higher than or equal to the threshold score. Formally, a scoring function associated with x is a mapping s x : C * → R satisfying the following property: for all (
A rule ϕ is a scoring rule if for each x ∈ A, there exist a scoring function s x and a threshold scoring functions such that for all R ∈ D and all x ∈ A,
For example, plurality-based scoring rule, denoted by ϕ pl-scoring , is the scoring rule that is associated with the following scoring functions (s x ) x∈A and threshold scoring functions: for each x ∈ A and each (
Clearly, if an object is accepted by plurality-based scoring rule, then there are more agents in favor of it than agents against it.
Every rule in Family Φ * , associated with (C x ) x∈A , is a scoring rule whose threshold scoring function is constant with the value 1 and whose profile of scoring functions (s x ) x∈A are such that for all x ∈ A and all (
Note that for any scoring rule, the score for each object x at a preference profile R is determined by N 
. Thus, for the decision on x, the positive vote by an agent i in favor of x is weighted by 
Axioms
In this section, we define several important strategic and non-strategic requirements, or axioms, of rules. We start with our two main axioms. The first axiom requires that misrepresenting one's preference should never pay off, independently of what others' representations are.
Strategy-Proofness. For all R ∈ D, all i ∈ N, and all
If a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, it can be implemented in dominant strategy equilibrium in the "direct revelation mechanism", and conversely. We refer readers to Gibbard (1973) , Satterthwaite (1975) , Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991), and Thomson (2000) for more discussions on strategy-proofness. In particular, Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) consider the same model as ours and study strategy-proof rules over the linear separable domain.
We next introduce a new axiom. Suppose that an object a is a null for an agent i. Then the decision on a will never have any effect on agent i's welfare and so he will be indifferent to the decision. It would be unappealing if the preference of such an agent plays a key role in the decision on a. The next axiom rules out this possibility. Formally:
Example 2. Family Φ * . Every rule in Family Φ * satisfies both axioms. Nullindependence is trivial. Strategy-proofness can be shown as follows. Each rule ϕ in Family Φ * makes decisions object-by-object. That is, the decision on each object x relies only on the group of agents in favor of x and the group of agents against x. Moreover, the decision responds non-negatively to the increase in the first group and non-positively to the increase in the second group. Thus, when an agent is in favor of x, he cannot increase the chance of the acceptance of x by saying he is against x. He cannot be better off by such a lie. Similarly, an agent cannot be better off by saying he is in favor of x, when he is against x. Therefore truthful announcement is always weakly better than lying, independently of what others' announcements are. , {b}) , and (G(R 3 ), B(R 3 )) = ({a, b}, {c}). Then the score of a is 2, the score of b is 0 and the score of c is -1. Therefore the threshold score is the average score 1/3 and so only object a is chosen, that is, ϕ pl-scoring (R) = {a}. Now suppose that agent 1 with true preference R 1 reports R 1 such that (G(R 1 ), B(R 1 )) = ({a, b}, {c}). Then the score of c decreases to -2, which lowers the average score and the threshold score to 0. Since there is no change in the scores of a and b, a is still chosen and now, in addition, b is chosen, that is, ϕ pl-scoring (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ) = {a, b}. Since {a, b} P 1 {a}, agent 1 is better off after the misrepresentation with R 1 . It is easy to show that this rule also violates null-independence.
We relate the two main axioms with the following two axioms, called "monotonicity" and "independence", studied by Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) , Kasher and Rubinstein (1998) , and Samet and Schmeidler (2001).
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Monotonicity requires that when the set of goods expands and the set of bads contracts for every agent, the choice should expand. Formally:
The next axiom requires that the decision on each object should depend only on agents' evaluations of this object in terms of good, bad, or null. For all R i ∈ S and all x ∈ A, let R i | {{x},?} be the restriction of R i to {{x}, ∅}. Let
Independence. For all x ∈ A and all R, R ∈ D with R| {{x},?} = R | {{x},?} ,
We consider the above axioms in conjunction with several combinations of the following standard axioms. We first define useful notation. Given each permutation on N, π : N → N and each R ∈ D, let R ≡ (R π(i) ) i∈N . For each x, y ∈ A and each X ∈ 2 A , let ρ x;y (X) ∈ 2 A be such that x ∈ ρ x,y (X) ⇔ y ∈ X, y ∈ ρ x,y (X) ⇔ x ∈ X, and for all z ∈ X\{x, y}, z ∈ ρ x,y (X). Thus, ρ x,y is the renaming operation that switch names between x and y. Given i ∈ N, for each R i ∈ D i , let ρ x;y R i ∈ D i be the preference where the roles of x and y in R i are switched: that is, for all X,
Voter sovereignty. For all x ∈ A, there exist R, R ∈ D such that x ∈ ϕ (R) and x / ∈ ϕ (R ) .
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Weak efficiency. For all R ∈ D, there exists no X ⊆ A such that for all i ∈ N , X P i ϕ(R).
({a, c}, {b}), and (G(
Since c is a null for both R 1 and R 1 , this shows a violation of null-independence. 16 Our axioms are stated differently from the axioms in these papers. We generalize their axioms in order to deal with non-linear preferences. 17 Our voter sovereignty is weaker than "voter sovereignty" in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991), which states that for all X ∈ 2 A , there exists R ∈ D such that ϕ (R) = X.
Efficiency. For all R ∈ D, there exists no X ⊆ A such that for all i ∈ N , X R i ϕ(R) and for some j ∈ N, X P j ϕ(R).
Anonymity. For all R ∈ D and all permutation
Neutrality. For all R ∈ D and all x, y ∈ A, x ∈ ϕ(R) if and only if y ∈ ϕ(ρ x,y R).
Results

Characterizations of strategy-proof voting rules
Throughout Section 4.1, we consider the separable domain (our results also apply to the additive domain) unless stated otherwise. We first characterize rules that satisfy monotonicity, independence, and some combinations of voter sovereignty, anonymity, and neutrality.
Proposition 1. A rule satisfies monotonicity and independence if and only if it is in Family
See the proof in the Appendix.
Remark 1.
In proving Proposition 1, we only use the three properties, A1-A3, of the separable domain. Thus, the same result also holds for any other subdomains satisfying these properties.
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Examples are subdomains in Example 1.
Within Family Φ * , it is easy to show that voter sovereignty, anonymity, 18 For domains without properties A1-A3, Proposition 1 may not hold. Here is an example. For simplicity, let A ≡ {a, b, c} and N ≡ {1, 2}. Let D * be the domain consisting of only the following three admissible preferences. First is a preference R 0 , in which only a is a good and both b and c are nulls. Second is a preference R 0 , in which only b is a good and both a and c are nulls. Last is a preference R 0 , in which a is a good, b is a bad, and c is a null. Then clearly this domain D * violates A1, since a is never a bad and c is always a null. Let ϕ * be the rule defined in the following table, where each cell represents the choice for the profile composed of its corresponding row and column preferences.
Note that the set of goods expands and the set of bads contracts only when preference changes from R 0 to R 0 . So clearly, ϕ * satisfies monotonicity. It is tedious to check independence of ϕ * . However since b ∈ ϕ * (R 0 , R 0 ) and b / ∈ ϕ * (R 0 , R 0 ), then ϕ * violates objectwise monotonicity (see p.27 for the definition) and so is not a rule in Family Φ * .
and neutrality are equivalent respectively to three properties, P-unanimity, Panonymity, and P-neutrality, of profiles of power structures. Therefore, we obtain the following corollary. Remark 2. In proving Propositions 2 and 3, we use either one of the two properties, Property P and Property Q, of the separable domain. The two results can also be established for any subdomain satisfying Property P or Property Q.
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For domains not satisfying either one of the two properties, the results may not 19 Properties A1-A3 are also required for Propositions 2 and 3. For example, in the domain D * , defined in the footnote of Remark 1, let ϕ be defined by the following table.
Note that the set of goods expands and the set of bads contracts only when preference changes from R 0 to R 0 . So clearly, ϕ satisfies monotonicity. It is tedious to show independence and efficiency of ϕ. Since agent 1 does not attain his best alternative at (R 0 , R 0 ) and agent 2 does not attain his best alternative at (R 0 , R 0 ), none of them can be a dictator. So ϕ is not dictatorial.
hold. For instance, when there are only two objects (see Example ?? for another example with more than three objects), there exist non-dictatorial rules satisfying the three axioms. For example, consider the following rule. Let
: |C 1 | = |C 2 |} → {0, 1} be a function, called, tie-breaking function, such that for each pair (C 1 , C 2 ) of disjoint groups with the same size, either τ (C 1 , C 2 ) = 1 or τ (C 2 , C 1 ) = 1 but not both. Let ϕ τ be the rule that makes the same decision on each object x as the "plurality rule" whenever the group of agents in favor of x and the group of agents against x have different sizes. When the sizes of the two groups ties, the decision relies on the tie-breaking function τ . Formally, for all R ∈ S N and all
, which is neither serially dictatorial nor dictatorial in Family Φ * , clearly satisfies monotonicity and independence. However, it is shown by Ju (2002a) that ϕ τ satisfies efficiency when there are only two objects. In the "variable agenda model", he characterizes the family of all such rules based on "non-manipulability", "restricted efficiency", and anonymity. 
Note that for each profile R ∈ S N Tri , the sum of utilities of X, i∈N U i (X), can be calculated in the following two equivalent ways:
Clearly, S N Tri and S N Di violate both Property P and Q. We now show that over any one of these two domains, there are non-dictatorial voting rules, for example, plurality rule ϕ pl , satisfying the three requirements in Proposition 2. 
Therefore by ( * ), i∈N U i (X) ≤ i∈N U i (Y ). It follows from this inequality that if someone is better off in X than in Y , then there is another who is worse off.
We next establish the logical relation between the following two combinations of axioms; the combination of strategy-proofness and null-independence and the combination of monotonicity and independence. We show that within voting rules, the two combinations are equivalent. 
Clearly, ϕ satisfies votes-only property. Since agent 1 always attains one of his best alternatives and ϕ does not depend on any other's preference, ϕ is strategy-proof. Suppose that x is a null for both R 1 and R 1 and that part (ii) applies for R 1 and part (iii) applies for R 1 , which is a bad for him, accepted also. Since his preference is dichotomous, the utility from a * will be cancelled out by the disutility from b * . Therefore, such a misrepresentation will not benefit him. Considering different cases, one by one, we can show that no one can ever be benefited by misrepresenting his preference. 
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Remark 4. This result can also be obtained over any subdomain satisfying Property R and either Property P or Property Q. If the domain violates these properties, the result may not hold. For example, when there are only two objects, neither Property P nor Property Q holds and the non-dictatorial rule defined in Remark ?? satisfies strategy-proofness, null-independence, and efficiency. Another examples are the trichotomous domain and the dichotomous domain. As explained in Example ??, the plurality rule satisfies all the three axioms.
The maximal domain result
In this section, we study how further the domain can be enlarged in order for rules in Family Φ * to be strategy-proof. To address this question, we need a more general definition of rules in Family Φ * . Our previous definition is made in terms of the set of goods and the set of bads, which are well-defined only for separable preferences. Note that the set of goods coincides with the intersection of all "top (or best) alternatives" and the set of bads coincides with the intersection of all "bottom (or worst) alternatives". We use these intersections to extend the definition of rules in Family Φ * . 22 Formal proof is provided in the Appendix of Ju (2002c) . He also shows that over the dichotomous domain, ϕ * satisfies efficiency. 23 Examples showing independence of axioms in Theorem 2 are available upon request.
For all preferences R i , let T (R i ) be the intersection of all top alternatives and B (R i ) the intersection of all bottom alternatives. For example, when R i is separable, T * 
Throughout this section, we restrict our attention to domains in which any object that is either in all top alternatives or in all bottom alternatives is critical when added to any alternative not including it. The addition either makes an improvement or the opposite. Formally:
Clearly, both the separable domain and the additive domain satisfy this assumption. However, it has nothing to do with the separability restriction. Indeed, any domain consisting of linear preferences satisfies Assumption D.
We further focus on domains that have enough variety of preferences in the following sense.
Definition. Domain D is rich if for all i ∈ N and all disjoint alternatives
Note that the richness property is an extension of property A4, which applies to subdomains of the separable domain. It corresponds to the richness property considered by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, p.605).
Given a power structure C, a pair (
Thus, the dummy agent does not play any essential role in accepting or rejecting x. Agent i ∈ N is a vetoer of object x if either for all (
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Thus a vetoer always has an option to reject or 24 The definition of dummy is a natural extension of the corresponding notion in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, p.606). In the linear domain, they coincide with each other. 25 The definition of vetoer is a natural extension of the corresponding notion in Barberà, accept x. We are interested in rules in Family Φ * that do not have any dummy or vetoer.
Fact 1. A preference R i is separable if and only if for all x ∈ A and all
Proof. (1) and (2) hold. To prove the converse, suppose (1) and (2) . Then for all x ∈ A and all X ⊆ A\x,
which is evidently equivalent to separability. 
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We first show (1) 
Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, p.606). In the linear domain, the two notions coincide with each other. 26 Since there is no vetoer, then for all y ∈ A, both C y and C * \C y are nonempty. So by P-monotonicity, (N \i, i) ∈ C y and (i, N \i) / ∈ C y , for all i ∈ N.
To prove the converse of (1),
Next we show (2) 
To prove the converse of (2), suppose
It follows from Theorem 1 and Proposition 5 that:
Theorem 3. The separable domain is the unique maximal domain, within rich domains, over which every rule in Family Φ * , without any vetoer or dummy, is strategy-proof.
Concluding remarks
Our impossibility result, Theorem 2, relies on domain properties, Property P or Property Q. There are various restricted subdomains that do not satisfy these properties. Examples are the trichotomous domain S Voting rules can be efficient at least over some subdomains, although not over the entire separable domain. Since there are finite numbers of objects and agents, every voting rule have possibly multiple maximal subdomains over which it is efficient. It would be interesting to identify these maximal domains, particularly for some standard rules such as "plurality rule" and "unanimity rule".
Over the linear separable domain, it is shown by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) that strategy-proofness and a slightly stronger version of voter sovereignty imply "tops-only" property, which corresponds to votes-only property in our preference domain. However, when non-linear preferences are admissible also, this implication no longer holds. The following example shows this.
. It is easy to show that ϕ satisfies strategy-proofness and the notion of "voter sovereignty" in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) . Clearly, ϕ violates votes-only property since it relies on the ordering between a and b.
The above rule is dictatorial. However, using the similar idea in its definition, we can also define non-dictatorial rules violating votes-only property.
Strategy-proofness pertains to the strategic misrepresentation of preferences by a single agent. When agents can form coalitions and manipulate the outcome jointly misrepresenting their preferences, we need a stronger requirement to prevent such manipulation. 
We refer readers to Moulin (1993) for a survey of literature on coalitional strategy-proofness. When a rule in Family Φ * satisfies this requirement and the full-range condition, coalitional strategy-proofness, applied to the grand coalition N , implies efficiency. Thus, by Theorem 2, this rule is serially dictatorial. However, serial dictatorship violates coalitional strategy-proofness. To prove this, consider the serially dictatorial rule associated with permutation π. Let R be the profile in which all objects other than a are null for all agents, a is a null for agent π (1), a is a good for agent π (2) , and a is a bad for π (3) . Then a will be chosen for R. But if π (1) and π (3) make a coalition and report jointly (R 1 , R 3 ) such that all objects except a are nulls for R 1 and a is a bad for R 1 , then a will not be chosen making π (3) better off, without making π (1) worse off. Therefore, there is no coalitionally strategy-proof rule satisfying the full-range condition within When there are only two agents, serially dictatorial rules in Family Φ * satisfy all the three requirements. In the two agents case, since the grand coalition is the only non-singleton coalition, it can be easily shown that the combination of coalitional strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty is equivalent to the combination of strategy-proofness and efficiency. When there are at least three agents, dropping voter sovereignty, we are left with only a small subfamily of Family Φ * , containing only the rules that either always select or never select each object, possibly except, at most, one object (see Ju, 2002b , for more details). 
A Proofs
Throughout this section, let D ∈ {S
G x (R) ⊆ N G x (R ) and N B x (R) ⊇ N B x (R ) , x ∈ ϕ(R) ⇒ x ∈ ϕ(R ).
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We need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For all R, R ∈ D and all
Lemma 2. A rule satisfies monotonicity and independence if and only if it satisfies objectwise monotonicity.
Proof. We only prove that both monotonicity and independence imply objectwise monotonicity. We omit the remaining part. 
We next show that rules in Family Φ * are the only rules satisfying monotonicity and independence.
Proof of Proposition 1. Clearly, every rule in Family Φ * satisfies monotonicity and independence. Let ϕ satisfy the monotonicity and independence. Then by Lemma 2, ϕ also satisfies objectwise monotonicity.
Let x ∈ A. Let C x be defined as follows:
and x ∈ ϕ(R).
Then by objectwise monotonicity, for each x ∈ A, C x satisfies P-monotonicity. Letφ be the rule in Family Φ * , associated with (C x ) x∈A . We only have to show
and x ∈ ϕ(R ). By objectwise monotonicity, x ∈ ϕ(R). Hence ϕ(R) ⊇φ(R).
In order to prove Propositions 2 and 3, we use a sequence of lemmas similar to those in the proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. 
When M = ∅, we say S is positively decisive for x. A group S ⊆ N \M is positively M -decisive if the group is positively L-decisive for all objects.
When M = ∅, we say S is negatively decisive for x. A group S ⊆ N \M is negatively M -decisive if the group is negatively M -decisive for all objects. When M = ∅, we say S is negatively decisive.
Moreover we also need to establish the following previous results, Lemmas 3-8. We omit the proof of the first one since it is straightforward. Proof. We use Property P of the domain D. The same proof can be established using Property Q instead. Let M ⊆ N and N \M = ∅. Let ϕ be objectwise monotonic and efficient. Let S ⊆ N \M, |S| ≥ 2, and i ∈ S. Assume that S is positively M -decisive. We show that either S\i or i is positively M -decisive. By Lemma 4, we only have to show that there exists x ∈ A such that either S\i or i is positively M -decisive for x ∈ A. Since |A| ≥ 3, there exist three objects, x, y, z, in A.
By P1, there exists R i ∈ D i such that:
y P i {y, z} P i x P i ∅ P i z, for all w ∈ A\{x, y, z}, ∅ P i w.
For all j ∈ S\{i}, by P1, there exists R j ∈ D j such that:
z P j {y, z} P j x P j ∅ P j y, for all w ∈ A\{x, y, z}, ∅ P j {w}.
For all h ∈ (N \M )\S, by P1, there exists R h ∈ D h such that:
∅ P h {y, z} P i {x}, for all w ∈ A\{x, y, z}, ∅ P h {w}. We next state two lemmas on negative decisiveness, corresponding to Lemmas 4 and 5. The proofs are similar to the previous proofs. Proof. Let ϕ be objectwise monotonic and efficient.
Step argument, changing preferences of agents in S 3 successively, then we obtain x ∈ ϕ(R S 3 ,R −S 3 ). Therefore, since (R S 3 ,R −S 3 ) = R , x ∈ ϕ(R ).
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemmas 13 and 14, strategy-proofness and null-independence imply monotonicity and independence. The converse also holds, since every monotonic and independent rule is in Family Φ * and so satisfies strategy-proofness and null-independence.
